In this paper we investigate the introduction of an export tax on steam coal levied by an individual country (Australia), or a group of major exporting countries. The policy motivation would be twofold: generating tax revenues against the background of improved terms-of-trade, while CO 2 emissions are reduced. We construct and numerically apply a two-level game consisting of an optimal policy problem at the upper level, and an equilibrium model of the international steam coal market (based on COALMOD-World) at the lower level. We find that a unilaterally introduced Australian export tax on steam coal has little impact on global emissions and may be welfare reducing. On the contrary, a tax jointly levied by a "climate coalition" of major coal exporters may well leave these better off while significantly reducing global CO 2 emissions from steam coal by up to 200 Mt CO 2 per year. Comparable production-based tax scenarios consistently yield higher tax revenues but may be hard to implement against the opposition of disproportionally affected local stakeholders depending on low domestic coal prices.
Introduction
Coal is both the fossil fuel with the highest carbon intensity per unit of energy, and an energy carrier that is globally abundant (cf. Rogner et al., 2012) . If climate change is to be kept within tolerable limits, most of the proven global coal reserves need to remain in the ground (cf. Meinshausen et al., 2009; McGlade and Ekins, 2015) . By contrast, over the past years a "renaissance of coal" can be observed (cf. Schernikau, 2010) .
Restrictions on coal use by importing countries are difficult to implement and, if successful, are likely to shift rather than reduce global consumption. Moreover, they may put fossil fuel exporters at a disadvantage which reduces their willingness to join a climate treaty in the first place. By contrast, supply-side policies could leave energy exporters better off through improved terms-of-trade and fiscal revenue. This may ease the climate treaty negotiating process and generates funding for the transition toward a low-carbon energy system.
In this paper, we focus on the case of an export tax on coal, investigating both the incentives for implementation, and the implications of withholding export supply. Specifically, we consider a hypothetical export tax on steam coal 1 levied by Australia, the world's second largest steam coal exporter, or alternatively by a group of major exporters. 2 We analyse the short-term and long-term effects on tax revenues, CO 2 emissions, and shifts in global steam coal trade.
Supply-side policies to mitigate climate change have recently gained attention in the literature. Sinn (2008) initiated the discussion by highlighting the specific reaction of resource owners to demand side climate policies due to intertemporal trade-offs: If climate policy became increasingly strict over time, resource owners would rationally react with earlier extraction which, in turn, would ultimately accelerate global warming-a green paradox. Consequently, climate policy should tackle the supply side and be designed to slow down the extraction path of fossil fuels or to incentivise the conservation of carbon in 1 According to the IEA (2013) steam coal includes all hard coal that is not coking coal (used for steel production), as well as sub-bituminous brown coal. Steam coal is mainly used for electricity generation and has by far the largest share in global extraction across the different types of coal.
2 The implementation of an Australian export tax for climate reasons has been suggested for instance by Peter Christoff: http://theconversation.com/ why-australia-must-stop-exporting-coal-9698, and Brett Parris http://theconversation.com/ expanding-coal-exports-is-bad-news-for-australia-and-the-world-17937, both accessed on November 20, 2013. An export tax is also discussed for Indonesia, see e.g. http://www.businessweek. com/news/2014-07-24/new-rules-in-indonesia-require-coal-exporters-to-have-licenses, accessed on August 10, 2014 , or PwC (2014 the ground. Harstad (2012) theoretically investigates a compensation scheme for resourcerich countries by introducing a market for extraction rights. Committing to conserve coal deposits in situ, a climate coalition can cost-efficiently achieve an emissions reduction without carbon leakage; resource owners in turn generate revenues by selling extraction rights. 3 In contrast to the proposed compensation mechanisms for reduced extraction, we focus on the complementarity of rent capturing and climate change mitigation, and investigate an export tax on steam coal. On the one hand, tax revenues are generated against the background of improved terms-of-trade-a motive for trade policy well-known from the literature. On the other hand, the implementation of an export tax represents a climate policy instrument as it reduces global coal consumption.
The extent of benefits are ultimately determined by the reaction of market participants.
Both short term adjustments (e.g. import substitution effects) and long run reactions (e.g. capacity expansions) of competing exporters and importing countries need to be taken into account. Hence, model-based numerical simulations are necessary to investigate the implications of an export tax and its potential as supply-side climate policy.
We set up the problem as a two-level game. At the upper level, one country, or a group of countries, maximizes the Net Present Value (NPV) of its tax revenues by levying an energy-based tax on exports that is proportional to the carbon content of the exported coal. The lower level is defined by a partial equilibrium model of the international steam coal market represented by optimizing representative agents. It is based on the COALMOD-World model (cf. Haftendorn et al., 2012b; Holz et al., 2015) which replicates global patterns of coal supply, demand and international trade in great detail. 4 It features endogenous investments in production and transportation capacities in a multi-period framework and represents the substitution relation between imports and 3 Asheim (2013) finds distributional advantages of supply-side policies, which are less prone to carbon leakage. Similarly, Bohm (1993) and Hoel (1994) show that depending on demand and supply price elasticities an optimal mix of demand and supply side policies may help to avoid carbon leakage. Hoel (2013) in turn finds that preventing the extraction of the most expensive reserves reduces overall emission and does not provoke intertemporal leakage. Kalkuhl and Brecha (2013) highlight the importance of the distribution of "climate rents", while Eisenack et al. (2012) find that a global carbon cap may indeed leave resource owners better off compared to a business-as-usual scenario, but depending on the allocation rule.
4 The literature on international steam coal markets is rather sparse, but recently gained more attention in line with the perception of a renaissance of coal. In the tradition of Kolstad and Abbey (1984) , two models of the international steam coal market have been developed using equilibrium modelling techniques, one model by Trüby and Paulus (2012) and the COALMOD-WORLD model (Haftendorn et al., 2012b; Holz et al., 2015) . These have been applied to analyse the role of Chinese steam coal transportation on the global market (Paulus and Trüby, 2011) , and to investigate different climate policy scenarios (Haftendorn et al., 2012a) . domestic production of steam coal. While the policy maker anticipates the reaction of market participants-and hence the impact on prices and quantities in equilibrium-affected exporters take the tax rate parametrically in their decision process.
We follow the literature and represent the international steam coal market as being competitive (cf. IEA, 2013; Trüby and Paulus, 2012; Haftendorn and Holz, 2010) . We further assume that national authorities of major exporting countries may well exert an influence on prices via trade policy, similar to Kolstad and Abbey (1984) and Kolstad and Wolak (1985) . We hence investigate the interaction between climate policies and the exertion of market power and contribute to the literature on strategic behaviour on the supply and demand side: Liski and Tahvonen (2004) , for instance, construct a game of two strategically acting groups of players: a supply-side cartel and a coalition of importing countries. The latter sets a carbon tax including trade policy elements in order to extract rents from the supplying cartel. Böhringer et al. (2014) show that carbon leakage rates depend on the market power of supply side cartels. In particular, if OPEC acts as a dominant player on the international crude oil market, carbon price may lead to negative carbon leakage within the oil market. Furthermore, Persson et al. (2007) and Johansson et al. (2009) argue that resource owners like OPEC may benefit from a global carbon price if the marginal price is set by other energy carriers which are more carbon-intensive and, hence, more affected by climate policies.
Instead of focussing on demand-side climate policies in the context of supply-side cartels, we investigate how export withholding serving the extraction of market rents can act as climate policy. Our contribution is thereby complementary to Faehn et al. (2014) , who derive the optimal mix of demand and supply side policies for resource-rich Norway.
While focusing on the crude oil market, they find that the largest contribution to meet CO 2 reduction targets should be made by withholding oil extraction. In contrast to Faehn et al. (2014) we focus on the steam coal market and on restricted exports. We further rely on a detailed representation of the supply side including capacity constraints and trade costs. Supply curves are hence endogenously derived and not determined by assumptions on long-term supply price elasticities.
Mathematically, the described two-level problem is a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). Numerical applications of MPECs can be found in a wide range of disciplines and research questions. In contrast to the analysis of market power with similar players (with identical objective functions) being modelled on both the upper and lower level (cf. Gabriel and Leuthold, 2010; Siddiqui and Gabriel, 2013; Trüby, 2013) , our framework is interested in an economic policy analysis given the reaction of market participants. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no study that numerically investigates the climate and distributional effects of a supply side climate policy instrument (at the upper level) on the international steam coal market (at the lower level).
As solution techniques applied to large-scale models are still in a development stage (cf. Gabriel and Leuthold, 2010) , we develop an algorithm combining different methods in order to solve the outlined problem.
Our main results suggest a positive and substantial Australian export tax of about 7 USD/tCO 2 that maximizes the NPV of tax revenues. However, we find a strong carbon leakage effect of more than 75% following the reduced Australian exports. Production is mainly increased in importing countries, like India and China. In contrast to the traditional energy market channel (cf. Burniaux and Oliveira Martins, 2012) , it is not a unilateral reduction of demand for fossil fuels that leads to carbon leakage, but supplyside policy: restrictions of one major exporter increases the world market price for steam coal, which gives an incentive for other producers to increase their supply.
The high leakage effect, together with lower profits of Australian steam coal producers, highlights the disadvantages of a unilaterally introduced export tax. By contrast, a coalition of the four largest exporters, Australia, Colombia, Indonesia and South Africa can benefit from a cooperatively set export tax. Moreover, CO 2 emissions are reduced to a larger extent in line with a smaller carbon leakage rate. We test the sensitivity of the results to the members of the coalition by adding the USA. We find a substantial increase in NPV revenue, while the country's calculated revenue share is marginal. Our results show that changing from an export tax to a production-based tax, which affects domesticoriented supply and export alike, consistently yields higher optimal tax rates and higher NPV revenues. However, such a tax may be hard to justify before local consumers which depend on a low domestic coal price.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model setup and the numerical solution method. Section 3 provides a description of the dataset and analysed scenarios. Results are discussed in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes.
Model Description
To investigate the effect of a tax levied by major stream coal exporting countries we consider a two-stage game: An optimal policy problem at the upper, and an equilibrium model of the international steam coal market at the lower level. We assume that the tax is introduced by a country-level economic decision maker g which anticipates the equilibrium reactions of all market participants, namely producers f ∈ F , exporters e ∈ E and final consumers c ∈ C of steam coal. In turn, these economic players take the policy decision parametrically. 5 In the following model description we focus on the formulation to represent a coal export tax. The respective formulation for a tax on coal production can be found in the Appendix A.3.
Upper Level: Policy Maker as Stackelberg-Leader
At the upper level, policy maker g can levy a tax τ E a on steam coal exports in periods a ∈ A in order to maximise the NPV of tax revenues over the model horizon. While the policy maker can decide on the initial tax rate τ E 0 starting in period a = a , the path is predetermined by an annual growth rate of r τ 6 :
We model the export tax based on the energy content of exported volumes; it is hence proportional to a carbon tax. 7 The policy maker's optimization problem is given by
where EXP aec subsumes total exports of all exporters e being located in decision maker g's territory, and directed towards consumption nodes c , which are outside g's territory.
Periodic revenues are discounted at rate r g .
Lower Level: An Equilibrium Model of the International Steam Coal

Market
At the lower level, two stylized types of players, namely producers and exporters, are represented by profit maximizing behaviour under specific operational and technical constraints. 8 Producer f can deliver its coal to local consumers and potentially to several exporters e, where the link is exogenously determined in line with geographical proximity.
In contrast, each exporter is assigned to one specific producer. In line with empirical findings the steam coal market is modelled as being perfectly competitive (cf. Haftendorn and Holz, 2010; Trüby and Paulus, 2012; IEA, 2013) : No individual producer or exporter can exert market power on consumers c that are represented by inverse demand functions.
Regional prices are endogenously determined in accordance with market clearing conditions. Hence, substitution between imports and domestic production of steam coal are endogenously determined. Furthermore, the model features endogenous investment into production and transportation capacities. Once an expansion is profitable, an investment decision is taken.
The capacity is increased and becomes operational in the subsequent period. We take into account quality differences of steam coal across production regions, and assume marginal production costs to increase as well as production capacity to decrease with cumulative extraction and without further investments-a mine mortality mechanism.
A Producer's Problem
Producer f is characterized by the quality κ f and reserves res f of its coal deposits; by its initial periodic capacity of extraction cap P f as well as by the transport costs to local consumers trans C af c and assigned exporters trans E af e . Moreover, costs of capacity expansions and the maximum periodic investment possibilities are producer-specific.
The objective of producer f is to maximise its profits discounted at rate r f . Accord-8 The lower level is based on COALMOD-World, a large-scale multi-period equilibrium model with a full representation of the value chain of the international steam coal market. The model has been derived and described in detail in Haftendorn et al. (2012b) , and thoroughly updated in Holz et al. (2015) . We adjust the model to our research question, and reformulate it according to the requirements of each of the applied solution methods (see section 2.3). In the Appendix we provide a list of endogenous variables in A.1, and the complete model formulation stated as equilibrium problem by Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions in A.2. ingly,
with revenues being generated from selling coal to local consumers, x af c at price p C ac and to exporters y af e at price p E ae . The remaining terms of Eq. (3) depict the costs of production Cprod af , the costs of transportation to the respective buyers trans C af c and trans E af e and the costs of potential investments into expanding the capacity of production Cinv P af and transportation to consumers Cinv T C af c and ports Cinv T E af c -all multiplied with respective decision variable. Note that, while coal is sold in terms of its energy content, costs of production and transportation incur in terms of mass units; hence, the multiplication by producer's quality factor κ f , which reflects the producer-specific conversion rate.
We assume a production cost function Cprod af that is quadratic in extracted quantities leading to linear periodic marginal costs of extraction:
where the intercept increases in cumulative extraction in former periods according to Eq. (5) with δ f being a producer-specific shift parameter:
This formulation implies a ranking of extraction from low to high costs deposits and ties periodic extraction.
The optimisation problem is subject to five constraints: 9
The first constraint (Eq. 6) requires that in each period production cannot exceed the production capacity, determined by the initial capacity, increased by capacity expansions in former periods and reduced by past cumulative production replicating the mortality of 9 For each constraint, the respective dual variable, i.e. Langrangian multiplier, is given in parentheses.
mines,
Similarly, the second and third constraint (Eq. 6 and 7) require that transportation capacities to consumers and exporters, respectively, are not exceeded. Hence,
Fourth (Eq. 9), cumulative extraction over the whole model horizon must not exceed available reserves,
and finally (Eq. 10), periodic investments in capacity expansions are limited according to
An Exporter's Problem
Exporter e in turn maximizes the NPV of its profits by deciding on the periodic amount of exported steam coal z aec to consumer c, and on expansions of export capacity inv E ae . Accordingly,
Exports are sold at price p C ac to consumer c, whereas costs incur from purchasing the coal at price p E ae , from port fees f ee e and from transportation costs sea aec . Both these fixed and variable trade costs are based on mass units, hence the multiplication by origin-specific quality factor κ e . Deviating from the original formulation in Haftendorn et al. (2012b) and Holz et al. (2015) , in our formulation an additional export tax has to be paid, if exporter e is located in the territory of decision maker g. Finally, investments in export capacity, inv E ae can be made at per unit expansion costs of Cinv E ae . Two constraints need to be taken into account: a restriction on the export capacity
and a maximum periodic investment level to expand this export capacity
Parameter cap E e denotes the initial export capacity, while inv E ae determines the maximum periodic investment possibilities of exporter e.
Market Clearing
The model is closed by means of inverse demand functions and market clearing conditions. Together they endogenously determine the prices paid by exporters and consumers according to
Solution Algorithm
In mathematical terms, the two-level problem described by Eqs. (1)- (15) is a MPEC.
Solving MPECs is a demanding task due the combination of optimization at the upper, and an equilibrium problem at the lower level which pose fundamentally different restrictions on potential solutions. 10
The most readily available option to solve MPECs using the software GAMS is to rely on the commercial solver NLPEC. The upper level, in our case represented by Eq. 2, together with a KKT reformulation of the lower level problem constitute the MPEC that is input to the NLPEC solver (see Appendix A.2 for the full set of KKT conditions given by Eqs. A.1-A.18). This solver works computationally fast and has been applied in the literature (cf. Huppmann and Holz, 2012; Trüby, 2013) .
However, this solution method is opaque and does not necessarily provide the user with the globally optimal solution. In order to circumvent drawbacks of the NLPEC method, we vary the upper and lower bounds of decision variable τ E 0 in a multitude of runs to obtain different local optima as candidate solutions. We pick the candidate with the highest objective value as our global optimum. As a robustness check we take a one level formulation of our problem and compute equilibrium results for a grid of different initial tax rates. The shape of the resulting distribution of tax rates suggests that the optimum obtained from the NLPEC runs is indeed global.
An established alternative is to reformulate the lower level problem into a MixedInteger Problem (MIP) by using disjunctive constraints (see Fortuny-Amat and McCarl, 1981 for the original formulation, and Gabriel and Leuthold, 2010 for a recent application).
We develop an algorithm that combines the two methods and apply it to smaller datasets. See Appendix A.4 for further details. However, due to extensive computational burdens, we rely on the NLPEC solver for the large-scale numerical application as described in the following section.
Model Specification and Scenario Descriptions
Data Description
We use a detailed dataset which represents all major steam coal producing and consuming countries covering 95% of world coal production in the base year 2010. Some countries are further disaggregated into separated geographical regions in order to allow for within country heterogeneity in resource deposits and transportation costs to consumption areas. This applies to Australia, China, India, Russia and the USA. Overall, we include 25 production, and 40 consumption regions as well as 16 ports of export. 11
The underlying dataset is collected from various sources and described in detail in Holz et al. (2015) . Exemplary, Fig. 1 shows the FOB costs for main production regions implied by our assumptions on production costs in the base year. Trade costs in turn are related to distances measured in nautical sea miles.
11 A complete list can be found in the Appendix. Note that our dataset incorporates more exporters (e = 23) than ports, to account for the case of more than one producing region being assigned to a specific port. By this modelling choice, we avoid any pooling problem due to quality differences across producers. The model solves in five-years steps starting in 2010; results are reported until 2030, while the model horizon is extended by one period in order to allow for profitable investments in the last reported periods.
Scenario Definitions
Our "Base Case" is constructed in line with the New Policy Scenario (NPS) of the World Energy Outlook 2012 (IEA, 2012) which we base our reference consumption levels on. 12
The NPS is a scenario of moderate climate policy, assuming the implementation of current energy and climate policy initiatives. While CO 2 emissions decline in some regions (e.g. by 16% between 2010 and 2035 in OECD countries), global emissions are on an increasing path. Accordingly, global steam coal consumption is projected to rise through 2035. China and India jointly share more than 70% of global coal consumption throughout. In contrast to reference consumption levels, the patterns of production and international trade flows are endogenously determined representing cost-minimization results.
Two export tax scenarios are constructed that deviate in the countries where the tax is levied; results then are compared to the Base Case:
• The first scenario "Tax AUS" focuses on a unilaterally set export tax on steam coal by Australia. 13 Australia has a large share in international trade of steam coal 12 Reference consumption levels, reference prices and demand price elasticities are used to derive the linearly approximated inverse demand curve in Eq. (15). 13 We distinguish the two Australian coal producing regions New South Wales and Queensland. The (about 16% in 2012 according to the IEA, 2013) and its policies are perceptible on the international market. The default settings further assume a discount rate of tax revenues at 5% (r g = 0.05) as well as a moderate annual tax growth rate of 2.5%
(r t = 0.025).
• The second scenario "Tax Coalition" analyses the situation of a coordinately set export tax by a coalition of major exporting countries, namely Australia, Indonesia, 
Discussion of Results
According to our expectations, the implementation of an export tax on coal would lead to four partial effects. First, coal extraction and exports from the tax-implementing country are reduced. Second, its supply on the domestic market gets more attractive compared to the alternative of exporting; hence, consumption in the tax-setting country increases.
Third, international production in all other countries increase: Export competitors compensate for the lower international supply, while net importers rely on domestic production to a larger extent. Finally, with an increase in world coal prices (the terms-of-trade effect), worldwide consumption of coal-and thus global CO 2 emissions-is reduced. These effects translate into a pronounced change in the patterns of trade.
The following discussion of scenario results analyses these tax-induced changes in the patterns of consumption, production and trade relative to the Base Case with a particular on CO 2 emissions and carbon leakage. 14 same tax rate applies to both regions. 14 Guiding Base Case results can be found in Table A .3 in the Appendix.
Scenario 1: A Unilateral Australian Tax on Coal
Given the optimization problem stated in Eq. (2), the tax revenue maximizing starting value of the Australian export tax is 0.66 USD/GJ. This is a significant level that is equivalent to a carbon tax of 6.7 USD/tCO 2 , or a tax of about 18 USD per tonne of Australian steam coal. Given the assumed discount rate of 2.5%, the NPV of tax revenues until 2030 is around 16 bn USD, with only small changes in periodic tax revenues. The effect on Australian consumption is small compared to the export effect, therefore production levels are reduced almost by the same amount as export levels. The gap between Base Case production levels and those under Tax AUS increases from less than 40 Mt in 2015 to more than 60 Mt in 2030.
The reaction to an Australian export tax is particularly visible in the production levels of all other countries (RoW). Figure 3 depicts production reactions in detail, divided into supply for the international and the domestic market. Country-level consumption patterns change for different reasons (see Figure 4) . First, importing countries generally suffer from an introduced Australian export tax. In particular, consumption is significantly lower in China and India despite the increase in domestic production. In Taiwan, one can observe an inter-temporal shift in the patterns of consumption with lower consumption in 2020 and 2025, but higher consumption thereafter.
Second, as discussed above, consumption in Australia is higher due to shifts from exporting to supplying domestic consumers. Finally, consumption is lower in other exporting countries such as in Russia or Indonesia due to an an increasing pressure to shift supply from the domestic to the export market. In summary, the unilateral introduction of an Australian export tax significantly changes global patterns of consumption, production and exporting, but only has a small impact on global CO 2 emissions.
Sensitivity Analysis: Discount Rate and Tax Growth
The optimal initial tax rate is found to be robust to changes in the discount rate within the range of r g ∈ [0, 0.10]. For instance, a discount rate of 0% changes the optimal initial tax rate to 6.72 USD/tCO 2 compared to the 6.73 USD/tCO 2 with the default assumption of a discount rate AT 2.5%.
Moreover, we analyse different predetermined annual growth rates of the export tax, i.e. 0% (constant), 2.5% (default; slow increase), 5% and 10% (fast increasing tax rate) as well as -2.5% (decreasing path). Intuitively, the lower the slope the higher the initial tax value. While the initial optimal tax rate decreases monotonically with the growth rate parameter, the function of the NPV of tax revenues is bell shaped (see Figure 6 ). Among the tested growth parameters, the default setting leads to a slightly lower NPV of tax revenues than does the introduction of a constant tax rate over time.
Export vs. Production Tax
The Australian export tax leads to a net reduction of global CO 2 emissions. However, coal consumption is shifted to domestic consumers and Australian emissions consequently increase. Furthermore, export taxes are criticised for their trade-diverting effects. For this reason, we compare our results to an optimally set production tax on coal. 17
While an export tax serves to hold back supply from international consumers and leads to a shift to domestic consumers, a production tax hits domestic and foreign consumers alike. Figure 7 shows that there exist two pronounced local optima in the NPV of tax revenue. The first one lies in the range of the export tax derived in the previous sections with an initial value of 8.78 USD/tCO 2 . Emissions reductions are more pronounced as both Australian exports and consumption levels decline.
The global optimum, however, is reached at a much higher initial tax level of almost 40 USD/tCO 2 . Tax revenue is substantially higher; emissions reduced to a larger extent.
However, we can see from Figure 7 that welfare, measured as the sum of producer surplus, consumer surplus and tax revenues, is substantially reduced. It is only domestic consumers who carry the tax burden as the production tax rate is prohibitive for any profitable 17 The introduction of a production tax instead of an export tax requires changes in the model equations which are described in detail in Appendix A.3. Figure 7: Australian tax revenues and welfare, in bn USD, as well as the reduction in CO 2 emission, in Gt, as a function of the initial production tax rate, in USD/GJ.
exports. 18 Production in 2030, in turn, is reduced to a tenth compared to the Base Case.
Scenario 2: A Jointly Set Coal Tax by Major Exporting Countries
A coordinately set export tax by the largest four exporting countries, Indonesia, Australia, South Africa and Colombia, leads to a stronger terms-of-trade effect and higher tax revenues compared to any unilateral policy action. The optimal tax level (based on the NPV maximization of joint tax revenues) is given by 0.99 USD/GJ. This is approximately 10.1 USD/tCO 2 , or 22-26 USD per tonne of exported steam coal (depending on the energy content of the respective coal). The tax rate is significantly higher than the unilaterally introduced Australian export tax.
The NPV of joint tax revenues reaches about 125 bn USD; the Australian share-in the absence of any coalition redistribution scheme-is 16 bn USD, which is similar to the revenues in the unilateral Tax AUS case. Figure 8 depicts the NPV of tax revenues as a function of the initial export tax rate and differentiated by coalition members. Depending on the tax level, Indonesia generates 45-65% of the annual tax revenue in this coalition.
Given that the seaborne trade only accounts for around 15% of total consumption, Figure 9 shows that, for a given tax level, the Tax Coalition case always has higher average revenues per tonne of CO 2 avoided (a market power effect) and higher cumulative emissions reductions than the Tax AUS case. Note that for the optimal tax rate the level of average additional revenues is at about 19 USD/tCO 2 (at cumulative CO 2 emissions reduction of 900 MtCO 2 )
for the Tax AUS case, while its is 30 USD/tCO 2 (at cumulative CO 2 emissions reduction of 4,100 MtCO 2 ) for the Tax Coalition case.
Taking the Australian perspective, Figure 10 shows how that the maximum tax revenues and welfare level both increased in the situation of a cooperatively acting coalition.
This is due to the reduced set of countries that countervail the Australian rent seeking policy setting. Worldwide, steam coal exports are reduced since no other exporting country can compensate significantly for the supply restrictions of the major four exporters. As in Tax AUS the rebound effect is mainly driven by a pronounced increase in production destined for domestic markets. Nevertheless, and as expected, the total rebound effect is less severe, and global consumption is reduced to a larger extent than in the unilateral Australian tax case. On average, global CO 2 emissions are reduced by 200 MtCO 2 per year, compared to yearly reductions of 37 Mt CO 2 in the unilateral case. Figure 11 summarizes these volume effect of the coalition's export tax, as well as it shows the impact on average consumer prices for coal. The relative price increase is most pronounced in the year the tax is introduced. In 2020 it drops from 8% to 1% but then again steadily increases to 3% in 2030. The price trend is proportional to the restrained supply by the coalition members. 
Coalition joint by the USA
To check the sensitivity of our results with respect to the members of the coalition, we examine the case with the USA joining the coalition. We find the optimal initial tax level at 12.2 USD/tCO 2 compared to 10.1 USD/tCO 2 in the coalition of the 4 major exporters only.
Total coalition revenues rise to 150 bn USD. While the effect of including the USA into the coalition is quite pronounced-leading to an increase of 2.1 USD/tCO 2 in the optimal tax level, and 25 bn USD of additional revenues-the US' share of revenues is rather small compared to the other members (see Figure 12 ). This poses the question of how the revenue is to be distributed, which we leave to further research. The high tax puts the price under pressure and leads to an increase of on average 8.5%. Competing exporters and domestic producers are increasingly unable to compensate for the restrained exports which lead to a 3% decrease in global consumption-and thus CO 2 emissions-over the model horizon. Figure 12 : NPV of tax revenues of coalition members, in bn. USD; and change in global consumption, export for all coalition members and total exports, in percentages, as a function of the starting value of the export tax, in USD/GJ.
Coalition: Export vs. Production Tax
A tax levied on both, the domestically oriented production as well as on exports in Colombia, South Africa, Australia, and Indonesia, is a major intervention in the cost structure of the world steam coal market which affects 17% of global production and 72% of global exports (2010 values from COALMOD-World dataset, based on IEA, 2013). Similar to the unilateral case, we find a higher commonly chosen production tax rate that exceeds coalition's export tax by 20% and reaches a level of 12.2 USD/tCO 2 . Figure 13 depicts the decomposition of tax revenues across members and shows how global emissions reduce with the initial production tax level. Notably, tax revenues as a function of the initial tax level peaks twice. Contrary to the unilateral tax scenario, here, the first peak yields the highest revenues. Figure 13 : Tax revenues of the coalition's members, in bn USD, and change in global CO 2 emission, in Gt, as a function of the initial common production tax rate, in USD/GJ.
In contrast to an export tax, the coalition's supply to its domestic market is substantially reduced. Overall, both production and export levels are reduced by almost 50%
in 2030 relative to the Base Case. Cumulative CO 2 emissions can be reduced by 9 Gt.
In this scenario South Africa, with its high and increasing domestic coal demand, has a dominant role in the coalition, with almost 50% of the coalition's revenue (compared to 15% in the export tax scenario). The NPV of the coalition's total revenue is 260 bn USD which is twice the amount of the export tax scenario. At the same time, the domestic consumers in the coalition countries are heavily affected by the tax and have to bear an average price increase of 10%, compared to a global average increase of 5%.
Qualification of Results
The analysis above has some limitations that are briefly discussed in this section.
At the lower level, we rely on a partial equilibrium model of the international steam coal market. Substitution with other fossil fuels is only indirectly taken into account through inverse demand functions. A relative price increase in coal-e.g. through the introduction of coal taxes-would partly ramp up the consumption of natural gas and crude oil. The effects on CO 2 emissions reductions from lower coal consumption would hence be partly compensated by more emissions from other sources. Nevertheless, since coal products are the most carbon-intensive fossil fuels, our analysis gives the upper bound of possible emissions reductions.
Moreover, in our setting only one country or a group of countries can act as Stackelbergleader. We consequently neglect policy reactions of other economic decision makers, like retaliation of importing or other exporting countries. Mathematically, representing more than one player at the upper level would constitute an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) which is solved differently; solution methods generally cannot be easily applied to large-scale models.
Finally, the path of the tax rate is exogenously given and not optimally decided on. This modeller's choice reduces complexity and avoids time inconsistencies of large jumps in the tax rate. Moreover, we analyse a variety of possible developments of the tax rate.
Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the hypothesis that large coal exporting countries have the option to help achieve global climate change mitigation, and at the same time improve their economic welfare. To this end we construct a tow-level game with a policy optimization problem at the upper level, and an equilibrium model of the international steam coal market at the lower level.
By restricting coal supply to international markets through levying a tax on exports, exporting countries reduce global consumption of coal and can benefit from a terms-oftrade effect and from generated tax revenues. While Australia may unilaterally generate perceivable tax revenues, our results suggest that a coalition of the largest exporters is necessary to significantly lower global CO 2 emissions and achieve welfare improvements.
We particularly find a strong rebound effect through increased Chinese coal production for domestic consumption. Our indicative scenario shows that including an additional coalition member (USA) strongly increases the coalition's total revenue, while the calculated revenue share of the new member is incremental.
International trade law and the possibility of retaliatory trade action by importing countries speak against the introduction of such export taxes and the formation of a cartel.
A production-based tax does not incur the same legal obligations under international trade agreements. Results consistently show higher optimal tax levels and higher NPV tax revenues, compared to the respective export tax scenarios. Affecting domestic supply and exports alike, this policy could be hard to justify against the opposition of domestic stakeholders dependent on low-price domestic coal supply. Investigation of why such coal export taxes are not widespread in practice is left for further work.
Without doubt, the analysed export tax alone is insufficient to avoid a severe increase in the global mean temperature. Nevertheless, supply constraints by fossil fuel exporters may hold promise as a climate change mitigation strategy, as they can leave the owners of fossil fuel reserves better off, in contrast to the conventional policy approach of tackling the demand side. This may in turn favour the formation of a global climate agreement.
Future research should investigate the game theoretical properties of coalition formation and its stability and examine the distribution of rents between different stakeholders in a country.
Appendix
A.1 List of Endogenous Variables. 
A.2 Formulation of the Lower Level as Equilibrium Problem
In order to numerically solve the lower level problem described in section 2.2, it needs to be reformulated in terms of KKT conditions, where each condition constitutes the derivative of the Lagrangian of the respective player with respect to one of its decision variables and to each of the dual variables of the constraints. The condition state that in equilibrium the decision variable and dual variables, and the respective derivative are perpendicular to each other.
Producer's KKTs:
Eporter's KKTs
Market Clearing -Export and Final Demand:
A.3 Production Tax -Adjusted Equations
The tax path in Eq. (1) now holds for production tax τ P a :
Accordingly, the optimization problem given by Eq. (2) is adjusted to (A.20) where P ROD af subsumes the production of all producers f being in the territory of policy maker g are affected by the production tax.
The producer's maximisation problem from Eq. (3) 
A.4 Solution Algorithm Using NLPEC and a Disjunctive Constraints Formulation
The Disjunctive Constraints formulation is an established method to solve MPECs, where the complementarity conditions of the lower level are reformulated into a MIP. However, this technique has two drawbacks well discussed in the literature: for large models the method is computationally expensive (cf. Luo et al., 1996) , while at the same time it requires the definition of upper bounds for all endogenous variables. Results are highly sensitive to these bounds and a 'bad choice' can generate misleading results and infeasibilities (cf. Gabriel and Leuthold, 2010) . 19 We develop an algorithm that combines NLPEC and Disjunctive Constraints solution techniques to overcome the drawbacks of the individual methods. Figure A .1 depicts how the two alternative formulations are combined in our approach. 
A.4.1 First Step: GAMS NLPEC Solver
In a first step, which is similar to the approach described in section 2.3, we solve the model using the NLPEC solver. Both a binary variable bin, and a sufficiently large positive constant K have to be defined for each complementarity condition.
For instance, focussing on the exporter's optimization problem we can write complementarity condition Eq. (A.12) by means of disjunctive constraints as follows:
Furthermore, the objective function at the upper level, more specifically the bilinear term given by the product of tax rate and exported quantities, has to be linearised. We follow Gabriel and Leuthold (2010) In order to test the candidate solution provided by NLPEC, we define the set of exogenous export tax rates in a close range around it. We hence test for optimality in a constrained set of choices. 20 
A.5 Model Specification
C_DEU
Denmark
C_DNK
Finland
C_FIN
Italy
C_ITA
Poland
P_POL E_POL
Gdansk
C_POL
Turkey
C_TUR
Israel
C_ISR
Ukraine
P_UKR
Ukrainian/Russian Donetsk
E_Black_Sea_UKR Odessa
C_UKR
Kazakhstan
P_KAZ
Ekibastuz
E_RUS_West
Ust?Luga 
C_KAZ
Russia
P_RUS
Kemerovo/Kuznets
C_KOR
Japan
C_JPN
Taiwan
C_TWN
Philippines
C_PHL
Australia
P_AUS_QLD
Queensland
E_AUS_QLD
Gladstone
C_AUS
A.6 Base Case results
